State Aid Authorities in South-East Europe: developments and challenges by Gjevori, Anduena
 
 
 
Euro-Balkan Law and Economics Review- n. 2/2019 ISSN: 2612-6583 
pp. 64-94 
ANDUENA GJEVORI* 
 
State Aid Authorities in South-East Europe: developments 
and challenges 
 
CONTENT: 1. Introduction. – 2. State aid control system - the EU Eastern enlargement. 
– 3. State aid obligations. Stabilisation and Association Agreements and beyond. – 4. 
Forms of State Aid Authorities in SEE countries. – 4.1. Inter-governmental State Aid 
Commissions: operationally independent?- 4.2. 4.2. Competition Authorities charged 
with State aid control .- 4.3. Other recent institutional approaches. – 5. Final remarks. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Since 1993, the Copenhagen European Council, has agreed on the 
conditions to be met by the applicant countries before they can join the 
European Union (EU). The so-called “Copenhagen criteria” require the 
countries, which want to join the EU to satisfy the political and 
economic criteria1.   
                                                 
* Visiting Lecturer/Researcher University of Bari “Aldo Moro”, Faculty of Economy, 
Department of Economy and Finance. anduena.gjevori@uniel.edu.al. 
1 The European Council stated: “Membership requires that the candidate country has 
achieved the stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for the protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning 
market economy as well as the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market 
forces with the Union. Membership presupposes the candidates’ ability to take on the 
obligations of membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union.” 
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However, for the South-East Europe (SEE) countries,2 formal EU 
membership conditions have emerged only after the Zagreb summit of 
November 2000, when the Stabilisation and Association Program (SAP) 
for the Western Balkans was launched.3  
Further, according to the conclusions of 2003 Thessaloniki European 
Council every SEE country has the perspective to join EU. 4  
The Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAA) are a very 
important element of the SAP process from the legal point of view. The 
main objectives of the SAAs are to support the efforts of SEEs to 
strengthen their democracy and the rule of law, to contribute to political, 
economic and institutional stability in these countries and also to support 
transition into a functioning market economy which is integrated into 
EU’s internal market. In the framework of the SAP process, the 
Stabilization and Association Agreements between the SEE countries the 
EU have been signed.5 At present, the SEEs are at different stages of EU 
integration.6  
                                                 
2 The expression SEE is used to indicate the countries of the Balkan Peninsula which 
have not joined EU yet: Republic of North Macedonia, Albania, Serbia, Montenegro, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Kosovo. 
3 European Commission: Final Declaration Zagreb Summit 24 November 2000, 
http://ec.europa.eu/enelargement. Accessed September, 2019. 
4 European Council of Thessaloniki, 16-6-2003, Presidency Conclusions Thessaloniki 
Agenda: Moving towards European Integration, http://ec.europa.eu/enelargement. 
Accessed September, 2019. 
5 The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Republic of North Macedonia was signed on 26. 03. 2001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
State Aid Authorities in South-East Europe: developments and challenges 
66 
Although the long EU pre-accession phase, the SEEs have been working 
on the approximation of their national laws with acquis communautaire. In 
particular, in the view of the obligations included in the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreements, the SEEs have all established internal State Aid 
control systems. All SAAs contain a general prohibition on any State aid 
which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain 
undertakings, modelled according to Article 107 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).  EU State aid rules have 
been part of the Treaty of Rome 1957, aiming to avoid national 
protectionism and subsidy races between Member States that would 
undermine free competition in the internal market. 7  
                                                                                                                   
The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Croatia was signed on 26. 03. 2001 and entered into force on 1.2.2005. 
The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Republic of Montenegro was signed on 15.10.2007 and entered into force on 1.5.2010; 
The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and Republic 
of Albania was signed on 12.6.2006 and entered into force on 1.4.2009; 
The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Republic of Serbia was signed on 29.4.2008 and entered into force on 1.2.2010; 
The SAA between the European Communities and their Member States and the 
Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina was signed on 16.06.2008 and entered into force 
on 1.06.2015; 
The SAA between the European Union and their Member States and Kosovo entered 
into force on 1.4.2016 
6 Accession negotiations started with Montenegro and Serbia respectively in 2012 and 
2013; North Macedonia and Albania were granted the EU candidate status respectively 
in 2005 and 2014; Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo are EU potential candidates.  
7 K. Bacon, European State Aid Law (Oxford University 2013), p. 4. 
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Differently, from the supranational enforcement of EU State aid rules by 
the European Commission, all South-East Europe countries have to 
establish national State monitoring authorities. Even before, during the 
EU enlargements rounds in 2004 and 2007, the then EU associate 
countries had to establish independent bodies equipped with the powers 
to apply the provisions on State aid. During the EU pre-accession phase 
the SEE countries have to fulfil three conditions: legislative alignment, 
an adequate administrative capacity of controlling State aid and credible 
enforcement record.8 
This article will investigate the institutional position of the State aid 
enforcement authorities in the SEE countries. It will be argued that the 
institutional set-up of the inter-governmental State Aid Commission 
introduced the SEE countries is inadequate. The analysis shows what 
kind of risks arise/arouse with regard to the independence of the first 
State aid authorities introduced in the SEE countries. The evaluation is 
based on State aid laws in SEE countries, Annual Reports of the national 
State aid authorities as well as on the progress reports issued every year 
by the European Commission evaluating laws adopted by the SEE 
countries in the framework of competition and State aid control and 
their implementation. The mapping of the types of State aid authorities 
in the SEE countries introduced/replaced since the signature of the 
SAAs, the continuous reforms of State aid rules in the SEE countries 
                                                 
8 M. Blauberger, “Compliance with Rules of Negative Integration” (2019) 16, Journal of 
European Public Policy 1, 1035. 
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and the attempt to understand their effects are a complex endeavor. This 
article is a first step in this direction. 
 
2. State aid control system - the EU Eastern enlargement 
The supranational enforcement of State aid control by the European 
Commission is quite unique.9 The primary EU State aid rules are 
included in the articles 107, 108, and 109 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Whereas, a vast amount of 
secondary legislation compliments the EU primary State aid law.10  
                                                 
9 EFTA Surveillance Authority has similar functions and powers as the European 
Commission with regard to State aid issues. In the framework of the European 
Economic Area it monitors State aid granted by Lichtenstein, Iceland and Norway. 
10 On May 2012 the European Commission adopted a Communication setting out an 
ambitious reform of the State aid which has resulted in the revision of several State aid 
documents such as the “Enabling Regulation” through Council Regulation No 
733/2013 of 22 July 2013 amending Regulation (EC) No 994/98 on the application of 
Articles 92 and 93 of the Treaty establishing the European Community to certain 
categories of horizontal State aid, OJ 2013 L204/11, Commission Regulation (EU) No 
651/2014 of 17 June 2014 declaring certain categories of aid compatible with the 
internal market in application of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty, OJ 2014 L187/1, 
Commission Regulation (EU) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application 
of Articles 107 and 108 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de 
minimis aid, OJ 2013 L 352/1 Guidelines on regional State aid for 2014-2020, OJ 2013 
C209/1, Guidelines for the application of State rules in relation to the rapid 
deployment of broadband network, OJ 2013 C 25/01, Guidelines on State aid for 
rescuing and restructuring non-financial undertakings in difficulty, OJ 2014 C249/01, 
Framework for State aid for research and development and innovation, OJ 2014 
C198/01, Guidelines on State aid for environmental protection and energy, 2014-2020 
OJ 2014 C200/01, Criteria for the analysis of the compatibility with the internal market 
of State aid to promote the execution of important projects of common European 
interest, OJ 2014 C188/02, Guidelines on State aid to promote risk finance 
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EU Member States are under obligation to notify in advance the 
European Commission of any State aid measure they intend to grant. 
They cannot implement the notified aid measure before the European 
Commission has approved them.11 
Differently, during the Eastern enlargement12 all Central and Eastern 
Europe Countries (CEE) had to establish national State aid monitoring 
authorities. Control of national State aid by national State aid authorities 
was a new approach, an exception to the supranational enforcement of 
State aid control by the European Commission.13 
As all CEE countries had been centrally planned economies, State 
intervention and support from public funds was a frequent method of 
solving problems. In addition, due to a difficult process of economic 
transition towards a market economy these countries had implemented a 
                                                                                                                   
investments, OJ 2014 C19/04, Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, OJ 2014 
C99/03. Commission Notice on the notion of State aid as referred to in Article 107(1) 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the 
European Union C262/1, 19.7.2016. 
11 The European Commission can take a position by either declaring the measure 
compatible with the internal market according to Article 107 TFEU, or by not raising 
any objections or by considering that the measure is not State aid.  
12 In 2004 and 2007, ten new Member States from Central and Eastern Europe 
Countries joined the European Union. In 2004, Cyprus, Malta, Hungary, Poland, the 
Slovak Republic, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania, the Czech Republic and Slovenia joined the 
European Union. Whereas in 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the European Union. 
13 P. Schutterle, “Implementing of the EC State aid control – an accession criterion” 
(2002) 1 EStAL. 
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lot of restructuring aid.14 Under these conditions the European 
Commission through the Europe Agreements (EAs)15 concluded with 
CEE countries introduced a ban on State aid corresponding to Article 
107 TFEU.16  
Moreover, the implementing rules adopted by CEE countries provided 
for the establishment of national State aid monitoring authorities. 17 
During the EU pre-accession phase also a credible enforcement record 
of the national State aid monitoring authorities was required.18 In the 
framework of the obligations provided by the EAs all CEE countries 
adopted State aid legislation and established national monitoring 
authorities. The effectiveness of State aid control in CEE countries can 
                                                 
14 K. Kuik,”State Aid and the 2004 Accession – Overview of Recent Developments” 
(2004) 3 EStAL. 
15 The European Integration of the Central and Eastern European Countries (CEECs) 
has been initiated with the so-called Europe Agreements (EA) and has been 
complemented by the pre-accession strategy. The EAs, as one of the tools for 
structuring accession, aimed at establishing a political dialogue among the Association 
Council Bodies and gradually introduce a free trade area to liberalise trade and provide 
for co-operation in areas such as competition law, environment, education and training 
and contained provisions on free movement of persons, establishment and supply of 
services to Member States and candidate countries. 
16 For more on state aid control as provided by the Europe Agreements see: 
M.Cremona, “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in Europe Agreements and 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements” (2003) 9 European Law Journal, p. 265-
287. 
17M.Cremona, “State Aid Control: Substance and Procedure in Europe Agreements and 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements” (2003) 9 European Law Journal, p. 265-
287. 
18 Blauberger (n.8). 
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be explained by a clear timeframe of EU membership for these 
countries.19 These countries adopted State aid laws only at a mature stage 
of the negotiations due to increased pressure.20Thus, once EU accession 
became a realistic political option for the candidate States the 
establishment of a pre-accession national State aid control system was 
likely to become a success story as the pre-accession national State aid 
control.21 
 
3. State aid obligations. Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements and beyond 
Following the example of the Eastern enlargement the European 
Commission introduced an internal system of State aid control also in 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAAs) concluded with the 
SEE countries. By signing the Stabilisation and Association Agreements, 
all SEE countries have committed themselves to adopting the area of 
State aid to the acquis communautaire. All SAAs contain a general 
prohibition on any State aid which distorts or threatens to distort 
competition by favouring certain undertakings.22  In the same line with 
                                                 
19 M. Botta, “State Aid Control in South-East Europe: The Endless Transition” (2013) 
1 EStAL, p. 83-94. 
20 M.Cremona (n 17), p. 286. 
21 A. Birnstiel and H. Heinrich, “State aid in the accession countries”, in E Szyszczak 
(ed), Research Handbook on European State Aid Law (Edward Elgar 2011) at 53. 
22 See Article 71 (1)(iii) SAA Albania; Article 73(1)(iii) SAA Montenegro; Article 73 (1) 
(iii) SAA Serbia; Article 71(1)(c) SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 69(1)(iii) SAA 
Republic of North Macedonia; Article 75(1)(c) SAA Kosovo.  
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the first paragraph of Article 107 TFEU, which provides the general 
principle according to which State aid is not compatible with the internal 
market.23 
Further, any of the abovementioned SAA-s provides that any practices 
involving State aid shall be assessed on the basis of the criteria arising 
from the application of Article 87 TEC (now Article 107 TFEU) and 
also the interpretative instruments adopted by the Community 
Institutions.24 These rules include present and future secondary 
legislation, frameworks, guidelines and other relevant administrative acts 
in force in the European Union, as well the case-law of the European 
courts.25 
In addition, an important obligation for all SEE countries pursuant to 
the respective SAAs would be the establishment of an independent body 
which will have the powers to apply the provisions on State aid.26 The 
SAAs clearly require the establishment of an “operationally independent 
authority” “entrusted with the powers necessary for the application” of 
                                                 
23 De Burca, EU law text, cases and materials. Oxford University Press, 2008 p.1092. 
24 See Article 71 (2) SAA Albania; Article 73(2) SAA Montenegro; Article 73 (2) SAA 
Serbia; Article 71(2) SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 69(2) SAA Republic of 
North Macedonia; Article 75(2) SAA Kosovo. 
25 M Cremona (n 17). 
26 Only the SAA with the Republic of North Macedonia does not expressly provide the 
obligation for the establishment of an independent State aid authority to enforce the 
general prohibition on State aids. See Article 71 (4) SAA Albania; Article 73(4) SAA 
Montenegro; Article 73 (4) SAA Serbia; Article 71(4) SAA Bosnia and Heerzegovina; 
Article 75(4) SAA Kosovo. 
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the State aid rules.27 These national State aid authorities should have, inter 
alia, the competences to authorise or disapprove State aid schemes or 
individual aid as well as to order recovery of unlawful aid.  
Aid transparency is another important obligation provided by the SAAs. 
Accordingly, each of the national State aid authority of the SEE 
countries has the obligation to create an inventory of existing state aid 
schemes, within a period of four/five years.28 In practice, the fulfilment 
of this condition is not easy, especially within a short time of period.29 
Moreover, aid transparency is ensured also by submitting annual reports 
following the methodology of the European Community on the total 
amount and the distribution of the aid granted and by providing upon 
request information on particular individual cases of public aid.30  
Another obligation under the terms of the SAAs with the SEE countries 
is to assess regional aid taking into account that the whole territory will 
be regarded “an area where the standard of living is abnormally low or 
                                                 
27 The elements related to State aid control included in the Stabilisation and Association 
Agreements concluded between EU and WB countries are analysed by Peter Schutterle 
in: State Aid Control in the Western Balkan Countries and Turkey, Vol. 2 EStAL, 2005, 
p. 255-263.  
28 See Article 71 (6) SAA Albania; Article 73(6) SAA Montenegro; Article 73 (6) SAA 
Serbia; Article 71(6) SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 75(6) SAA Kosovo. Only 
the SAA with the Republic of North Macedonia does not expressly provide this 
obligation.  
29 L. Bieguriski, “Sensitivity of sectors and the need of State aid reforms in economies 
in transition” (2008) 4 EStAL, p. 671. 
30 See Article 71 (5) SAA Albania; Article 73(5) SAA Montenegro; Article 73 (5) SAA 
Serbia; Article 71(5) SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina; Article 69(3) (b) SAA North 
Macedonia; Article 75(5) SAA Kosovo. 
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where there is serious underemployment” consequently any development 
aid could be justified. The SEE countries benefited from this exclusion 
from the full application of EU state aid acquis for a period of four/five 
years.31 On the basis of the SEE countries GDP’s per capita figures, 
harmonised at NUTS II level the respective state aid authorities of the 
SEE countries and EU Commission (will) have jointly evaluated the 
eligibility of the regions as well as the maximum aid intensities in order 
to prepare the regional aid map. Moreover, a protocol attached to the 
SAAs provides an exception of five years within with the SEEs can grant 
aid to the steel sector for restructuring purposes.32 
A strong monitoring authority, the EU Commission, evaluates laws 
adopted by Western Balkan countries in the framework of State aid 
control and closely assesses their implementation through annual 
Progress Reports published yearly for each SEE country. 
The SAA-s are the main international engagement demanding the SEE 
countries to create an internal State aid control system. Additionally, two 
other international commitments require the SEEs to adopt State aid 
legislation, namely: the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA)33 and Energy Community Treaty (EnCT).34 Participation of 
                                                 
31 Excluding Albania which benefited for a period of ten years and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for a period of six years. See Article 71 (7) SAA Albania; Article 71(7) (a) 
SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina.  
32 Protocol 1 SAA Albania; Protocol 4 SAA Bosnia and Herzegovina; Protocol 5 SAA 
North Macedonia; Protocol 5  SAA Serbia; Protocol 5 SAA Montenegro. 
33 CEFTA 2006: Central European Free Trade Agreement, between the SEE countries. 
The text of the agreement can be found in: https://cefta.int. Accessed October 2019. 
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the SEE-s countries in both CEFTA and EnCT, in particular, encourage 
SEEs to comply with their obligations also in the view of the future 
membership in the European Union. SAA-s, CEFTA and the EnCT 
concluded between EU and the SEE countries provide a general State 
aid prohibition.  
Pursuant to Article 21 of the Central European Free Trade Agreement 
(CEFTA 2006) “any aid granted by a Party or through State resources in 
any form whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition 
by favouring certain goods shall, in so far as it may affect trade between 
the Party concerned and other Parties of this Agreement be compatible 
with the proper functioning of this Agreement”.35 The same Article of 
the CEFTA requires the parties to evaluate any practices involving State 
aid on the basis of the criteria provided by Article 107 Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union.36  
However, the CEFTA agreement does not require the Members States 
to establish a national State aid monitoring authority enforcing the 
abovementioned general prohibition on State aid. The review 
competence rests with the Members States. Accordingly, it depends on 
the willingness of a CEFTA Member State to challenge other Member 
                                                                                                                   
34 The text of the Treaty establishing the Energy Community is available at: 
https://www.energy-community.org/legal/treaty.html Assessed October 2019. 
35 Article 21 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 2006). 
36 Further, transparency in the area of State aid, is ensured by annual reports, containing 
the total amount and the distribution of the aid given, submitted by each Party to the 
Joint Committee. See article 21/7 Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA 
2006). 
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States, which are considered to allow State aids at internal level.  Further, 
the agreement provides for the mutual withdrawal of the trade 
concessions.  
Finally, the Energy Community Treaty (EnCT) is another international 
commitment concluded by the EU, which requires the SEE countries,37 
to adopt State aid laws. The Treaty, which entered into force in 2006, 
aims to expand EU’s internal energy market towards South-East Europe 
and beyond. The contracting parties are required to implement the acquis 
communautaire on energy, environment, competition and renewables, 
before their accession to EU. 
Pursuant to Article 18 of the EnCT “any public aid which distorts or 
threatens competition by favouring certain undertakings or certain 
energy products” is prohibited in the energy sector.  The implementation 
of the treaty is entrusted to the Secretariat of the EnCT. In case of 
infringement of the Treaty the Secretariat can start investigations. 
Although the Secretariat cannot impose sanctions, it can bring the case 
to the Ministerial Council of the Energy Community. The latter can 
among others withdraw the rights of voting from the contracting party 
which is in breach of the treaty obligations.38 The EnCT Secretariat, the 
guardian of the Treaty, has opened a number of investigations.  Thus, in 
                                                 
37 All SEE countries: Albania; Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia, Kosovo have signed the Treaty Establishing the Energy 
Community. In 2010 Moldova and Ukraine joined the EnCT. Whereas, in July 2017 
Georgia joined the EnCT. 
38 Articles 67, 90, 92 Treaty Establishing the Energy Community. 
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2010 an investigation against Bosnia and Herzegovina was opened with 
regard to the failure of the later to adopt State aid legislation.39  
One year later, another investigation was started against Kosovo, again 
due to lack of adoption of State aid law by Kosovo.40 Both countries did 
approve the respective laws on State aid. 
 
4. Forms of State Aid Authorities in SEE countries 
All SEE countries have adopted national State aid laws. Bosnia and 
Herzegovina was going to be the last SEE country to adopt a State aid 
law in February 2012. Although, these laws are in line with EU State aid 
law, further efforts are needed for the approximation with EU law of the 
secondary legislation adopted in each of the SEE countries.41Moreover, 
these countries have also implemented their obligation to create 
“operationally independent” State aid authorities as provided by the 
respective SAAs. As the SEEs are free to choose the ways of organising 
their State aid control system, at first, they all established State Aid 
Commissions closely linked to the Ministry of Finance.  
At present, after the majority of the SEEs have introduced new laws on 
State aid, different institutional solutions of organising their State aid 
control authorities are implemented. Consequently, in Macedonia and 
                                                 
39 Case 1/10, Dispute settlement procedure initiated against Bosnia and Herzegovina 
for the failure to adopt State aid legislation. Opened on 22 September 2010. 
40 Case 7/11, Dispute settlement procedure initiated against Kosovo for the failure to 
adopt State aid legislation. Opened on 9 February 2011. 
41 M Botta (n 19). 
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Montenegro State aid rules are implemented by the Commission/Agency 
for the Protection of Competition, in Kosovo and Serbia by a State Aid 
Commission accountable to the Parliament.Whereas, Albania and Bosnia 
and Herzegovina continue to assign the task to control and monitor 
State aid to an inter-governmental State Aid Commission. After 
accession to EU the national State aid legislations will become obsolete 
and the role national State aid monitoring authorities will change. It will 
be the European Commission which will declare State aid compatible 
with the internal market. The EU rules on State aid will become directly 
applicable and national legislation will become obsolete. However, most 
of countries which joined EU during the enlargements rounds in 2004 
and 2007 have retained their national State aid control systems, to 
preserve knowledge and expertise gained during the pre-accession 
phase.42 
 
4.1.  Inter-governmental State Aid Commissions: operationally 
independent? 
The Albanian State Aid Law establishes a decision-making body which is 
the State Aid Commission (SAC).43 Pursuant to, the 2005 State Aid Law, 
the SAC is the competent body to evaluate and authorise State aid 
                                                 
42 K. Kuick, “State aid and the 2004 Accession – Overview of recent developments” 
(2004) 3 EStAL, p. 370-371; Jagodic-Lekocevic, “Future role of the former National 
Monitoring Authorities and existing aid in Slovenia, Poland and Estonia” (2004) 3 
EStAL, p. 376. 
43 Law on State aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania no. 36/2005. 
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schemes and individual aid and may also order recovery of unlawful 
aid.44  
Additionally, the above-mentioned law establishes a State Aid 
Department (SAD) as an administrative body, functioning under the 
ministry responsible for economy. This structure is entrusted with the 
competence to carry out investigations and prepare proposals for State 
aid decisions taken by the SAC.45  The SAC is composed of five 
members appointed by the Council of Ministers upon the proposals of 
the minister of finance, minister of economy, minister of justice and one 
member from the civil society.46 The 2016 cosmetic amendments to the 
law on state aid, in particular with regard to the guarantees ensuring the 
independence of the SAC, provided for one member to be proposed by 
the minister responsible for European integration instead of the minister 
of economy.47  
On the other hand, the minister responsible for economy and finance, 
became the head of the SAC.48 Appointed for a mandate of four years, 
                                                 
44 Article 17 of the law on State aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania no. 
36/2005. 
45 Article 18 of the law on State aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania no. 
36/2005. 
46 Article 16, paragraph 2 of the law on State aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Albania no. 36/2005. 
47 Official Gazette of the Republic of Albania no. 47/2016. 
48 At present, the Minister for Finance and Economy, the biggest grantor of aid, is the 
head of the State Aid Commission, as the Ministry of Finance and that of the Economy 
merged in 2017. 
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members of the SAC should be professionals who have experience in 
the field of economy. Although the 2005 State Aid Law expressly 
provides that the SAC is independent while performing its duties the 
independence of the SAC shows weaknesses. The presence of the 
minister responsible for economy as the head of the SAC and the 
presence of one member from the ministry of finance, two biggest 
grantors of aid, raises questions about the conflict of interest.  
Further, the members are working only part-time for the SAC as they are 
usually civil servants working for ministries or for other institutions. Also 
the approval of the annual reports of the SAC by the Council of 
Ministers might affect the independence of the State Aid Commission as 
well. Moreover, the State Aid Department, located in the structure of the 
ministry responsible for economy depends on it.  
This ministry is likely to be the main granter of aid, which can raise 
questions about the objectiveness of the proposals prepared by SAC and 
so about the objectiveness of the decisions of the State Aid Commission 
itself. The operational independence of the Albanian State Aid 
Commission has been continuously criticised by the progress reports 
issued by the European Commission for Albania.  
The most recent EU Commission Progress Report concluded that the 
Albanian SAC could not “be considered an operationally independent 
authority” an express condition provided by the Stabilisation and 
Association Agreement between Albania and EU.49 
                                                 
49 European Commission: Albania Report, COM (2019) 260 final, SWD 215 p. 62-63. 
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In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Law on State Aid System was adopted in 
February 2012. Pursuant to Article 7 of the 2012 Law on the System of 
State Aid, the State Aid Council (SAC) is in charge of controlling and 
monitoring State aid in the country. The SAC evaluates and authorises 
State aid schemes. It can also order recovery of State aid and launch ex-
officio investigations, as well as perform the subsequent assessment of the 
State aid granted.50  
The eight members of the State Aid Council are appointed by the 
Council of Ministers, by the governments of the entities and Brčko 
District. Appointed for a period of four years, member of the SAC should 
be well-known experts in the field of economics and law. A secretariat 
supports the Council in expertise, technical and legal assistance.51 
Although, the abovementioned Secretariat, is not part of any ministry, it 
suffers from lack of necessary administrative capacity to fulfill its 
duties.52  
Moreover, the independence of the SAC established in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina shows weaknesses not only with regard to the nomination 
of its members, which make it depended on Government, particularly 
aid-granting ministries, but also with regard to its financing. Provided by 
                                                 
50  Article 10 of the Law on the System of State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 10/2012. 
51 Article 7 of the Law on the System of State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 10/2012. 
52 European Commission: Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
application for membership of the European Union, COM (2019) 261 final, SWD 
(2019) 222, p. 101-102. 
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the 2012 on State Aid System Law to be financed in equal parts by the 
Council of Ministers, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina,53 the State Aid Council never received the total financing 
contribution from the Republika Srpska. Consequently, the 2019 opinion 
of the EU Commission assessing the application of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina for membership in the European Union, required the 
country to “ensure that the State Aid Council is operationally 
independent and obtains adequate financing, including outstanding 
contributions from the Republika Srpska entity”.54  
 
4.2. Competition Authorities charged with State aid control 
North Macedonia was going to be the first country, among the countries 
analyzed in this article, to adopt a law on State Aid Control. The 2003 
Macedonian State Aid Law provided for a State Aid Commission as the 
administrative capacity for the control of State aid.55  Pursuant to Article 
9 of the above-mentioned law, the Macedonian SAC was appointed by 
the Government upon proposal of the Ministry of Economy (two 
members) and Ministry of Finance (one member). Whereas, 
administrative-professional tasks were performed by the Ministry of 
                                                 
53 Article 9 of the Law on the System of State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina No. 10/2012.  
54 European Commission: Commission Opinion on Bosnia and Herzegovina’s 
application for membership of the European Union, COM (2019) 261 final, SWD 
(2019) 222, p. 101-102. 
55 Law on State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia No. 
24/2003.  
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Economy. Less than two years later, the EU Commission was very 
critical about the independence of the Macedonian State Aid 
Commission. Pointing the weaknesses of such institutional design the 
2005 EU Progress Report concluded that it was impossible for the SAC 
to enforce the State aid rules independently.56 The Macedonian SAC did 
depend on the Government in terms of its membership and also 
financially. The three part-time members of the SAC, represented the 
two biggest grantors of aid. Moreover, SAC did not have its own offices 
and did depend financially from the Ministry of Finance.  
Accordingly, the 2006 amendments to the Law on State Aid provided for 
the transfer of the competence to monitor and control of State aid to the 
Macedonian Commission for the Protection of Competition.57  
The EU commission would assess such a transfer of powers as “an 
important step forward to ensure an independent state aid 
authority”.58The Macedonian Commission for the Protection of 
Competition (CPC) is established by the legal provisions on competition 
as an independent authority having a legal personality.59 Moreover, the 
                                                 
56 European Commission: Analytical Report for the opinion on the application from 
the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia for EU membership, COM (2005) 562 
final, SEC 1425, p. 68. 
57 Law on State aid control, Official Gazette of the Republic of North Macedonia 
70/2006. 
58 European Commission: The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress 
Report, COM (2006) 649 final, SEC 1387, p. 30. 
59 Article 26 of the Law on Protection of Competition, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of North Macedonia no. 136/11. 
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president and four members of the CPC are appointed by the Parliament 
and the CPC is accountable to the Parliament.  
In 2018, through a new law on State aid, also Montenegro was going to 
transfer State aid control to its Agency for Protection of Competition.60  
In order to integrate also State aid control, the Montenegrin Agency for 
Protection of Competition (APC) did undergo an internal re-
organization.61 Although operationally independent62 the members of 
the APC are appointed by the Government.63 Again the EU 
Commission would assess integration of State aid control within the 
Agency for Protection of Competition an essential step for Montenegro 
“to meet the SAA requirement on the operational independence of the 
State aid authority”.64  
For more than a decade, the responsibility to control and monitor State 
aid in Montenegro, was given to a State Aid Control Commission 
                                                 
60 Article 5 of the Law on State Aid Control, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Montenegro No. 74/09 and 57/11. 
61 A new Council of the Agency is established composed of President and two 
members: one for competition and one for State aid. Additionally, the director of the 
Agency will have two deputies: one for competition and one for State aid. See Law on 
the Protection of Competition, Official Gazette of the Republic of Montenegro No. 
44/12 as amended in 2018 Article 20b. 
62 European Commission: Montenegro Report, COM (2018) 450 final, SWD 150, p. 58. 
63 Article 20b of the Law on the Protection of Competition, Official Gazette of the 
Republic of Montenegro No. 44/12 as amended in 2018. 
64 European Commission: Montenegro Report, COM (2019) 260 final, SWD 217 p. 63. 
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(SACC).65 The members of the SACC were appointed by the 
Government nominated by the ministry and state administration bodies 
in charge of economic development, sustainable development and 
maritime affairs and transportation (three members) and by the 
association of employers (one member).66 Additionally, the chairperson 
was nominated by the Ministry of Finance. The members of the SACC 
were appointed for a period of four years with the right to be re-
appointed. Having its offices within the Ministry of Finance, the later 
would also perform professional and administrative work as regards the 
SACC.67  
It was difficult for the SACC to be independent while its membership 
created potential conflict of interest and while it was assisted by a 
department within the Ministry of Finance. This administrative capacity 
for State aid control did not satisfy the commitment of “an operationally 
independent authority”, an express condition of the SAA.68 
                                                 
65 For more on State aid control in Montenegro see:  D. Lagzdina and S. 
Kurtagic,”Challenges of Montenegro in the field of State aid” (2015) 4 EStAL, p. 522-
527. 
66 Before, the 2009 Montenegrin State aid Law provided for a State Aid Commission 
appointed by the Government, charged with the implementation of the State aid rules. 
In the same line, the 2011 State aid Law abolishing the above-mentioned law, gave the 
responsibility to control and monitor State aid to a State Aid Control Commission 
(SACC). The 2011 State aid law decreased only the number of the members of the 
SAC. 
67 Articles 11 & 12 of the Law on State Aid Control, Official Gazette of the Republic of 
Montenegro No. 74/09 and 57/11. 
68 European Commission: Montenegro Report COM (2016) 715 final, SWD 360, p.38. 
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4.3. Other recent institutional approaches 
Other institutional approaches to control and monitor State aid are 
recently introduced in Serbia and Kosovo. In the case of Serbia, by 
beginning of October 2019, the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia 
approved a new Law on State Aid.69 Pursuant to the 2019 State Aid Law, 
the Commission on State Aid Control will obtain legal personality. Other 
guarantees are provided by the above-mentioned law in order to ensure 
the independence of such Authority. The CSAC will be responsible to 
the Parliament, to which it will submit its annual reports. The CSAC will 
be composed of the “President of the Council” and the “Council”, who 
are elected by the Parliament, through public competitions. Pursuant to 
the 2019 State Aid Law, expert services within the CSAC, are managed 
by the Secretary General. The employees’ status of civil servant will allow 
them to perform their functions objectively, fully and impartially. 
In 2017, also Kosovo introduced a new law on State aid.  Pursuant to the 
2017 State Aid Law, in Kosovo, the function of a State aid authority, is 
divided between: the State Aid Commission and the State Aid 
Department.70  
The members of the State Aid Commission (SAC) will be appointed by 
the Parliament of the Republic of Kosovo, instead of the Government. 
                                                 
69 Law on State Aid Control, Official Gazette of the Republic of Serbia No. 73/2019. 
70 Articles 8 and 9 of the Law on State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo 
No. 3/2017. 
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The five members of the State Aid Commission, with expertise in the 
field, are appointed for a mandate of three years, with the possibility of 
being re-elected. Pursuant to the abovementioned law being a member 
of the SAC is not compatible with any public function or political 
appointed position. Also the approval of the annual reports of the SAC 
by the Parliament is another element which increases its independence. 
The SAC adopts itself the working regulation defining its organization, 
decision-making procedure and also measures against conflict of interest.  
However, a remark can be made about the Department of State Aid 
which is transferred from the Competition Authority to the Ministry of 
Finance. As mentioned above, the Ministry of Finance is likely to be one 
of the main grantors of aid, so the independence of the Department of 
State Aid is questionable. Moreover, strong working relationships 
between the State Aid Commission and the Department of State Aid will 
be required in order to ensure progress in the decision-making process.  
Before, State aid rules in Serbia and Kosovo were implemented by State 
Aid Commissions closely linked to the Government. The 2009 Serbian 
State Aid Law had established a two-tier State aid controlling system.71  
The State Aid Commission (SAC) was the decision-making body and the 
State Aid Department, within the Ministry of Finance, was the 
administrative body of this two-tier system. Pursuant to, the above-
mentioned law the SAC was appointed by the Government upon 
                                                 
71 For more on the 2009 State Aid Law in Serbia see: Dojkovic, Comments on the new 
State Aid Law in Serbia in the context of Serbia’s accession to EU, Vol 2 EStAL 2010, 
p. 347-360. 
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proposal of the Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of 
Infrastructure, Ministry of Environmental Protection and the 
Commission for Protection of Competition. Headed by the 
representative of the Ministry of Finance, the members of the SAC, 
experts in the field of State aid, competition, EU law, were appointed for 
a term of five years with the right to be re-elected. 72 The weaknesses of 
such composition with regard to the independence of the CSAC were 
remarkable, as the members of the SAC were generally appointed by 
ministries which grant aid. Additionally, lack of a separate budget or 
separate administrative capacity negatively affected the operational 
independence of the CSAC.73 Consequently, the EU Progress Report 
clearly stated in May 2019 that “the CSAC cannot be considered as 
operationally independent” an obligation provided by the Stabilisation 
and Association Agreement between EU and Serbia.74 
In Kosovo, pursuant to the 2012 State aid law the State aid Commission, 
the decision-making body, was appointed by the Government under the 
proposal of Ministry of Finance, for a mandate of four years. The SAC 
chaired by the Minister of Finance, was composed of four members 
respectively: the Minister of European Integration, the Minister of Trade 
                                                 
72 See Article 6 and 7 of the Law on State Aid Control, Official Gazette of the Republic 
of Serbia No. 51/2009. 
73 M Milenkovic, “The transformation of State aid control in Serbia and EU 
conditionality” (2018) 1 EStAL, p. 66-79. 
74 European Commission: Serbia Report, COM (2019) 260 final, SWD 219, p. 64. 
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and Industry, the chair of the Association of the Municipalities of 
Kosovo and one representative from the civil society.75  
Additionally, the State Aid Office within the Competition Authority, was 
entrusted with the competence to control notified State aid measures, 
prohibit aid, accomplish ex post control of aid and the recovery of illegal 
aid. The EU Commission would voice its concerns with regard to the 
operational independence and impartiality of the Kosovo SAC, asking 
for new law on State aid.76 According to the 2016 EU Commission 
Progress Report no decisions were rendered since the Law on State Aid 
had entered into force.77  
 
5. Final remarks  
Fulfilling their international commitments, the SEEs have made progress 
by adopting their Laws on State Aid control. However, the establishment 
of a legal base is necessary but not a sufficient step towards creating an 
effective State aid control system. In implementing their obligation to 
establish an “operationally independent” State aid monitoring authority, 
the first choice of all SEEs was the establishment of State Aid 
Commissions closely linked to the Government/Ministry of Finance. In 
this institutional model the link between the Government and State Aid 
                                                 
75 Article 8 and 7 of the Law on State Aid, Official Gazette of the Republic of Kosovo 
Nr. 13/2011. 
76 European Commission: Kosovo Report, SWD (2015) 215 final, p. 41. 
77 European Commission: Kosovo Report, COM (2016) 715 final, SWD 363 p. 48. 
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Commission was to the detriment of the independence of the State Aid 
Commissions. The later, were mainly collegial bodies appointed by the 
Government. As a rule, representatives of the Ministry of Finance and of 
the Ministry of Economy the two biggest grantors of aid were members 
of the above-mentioned State Aid Commissions. This raised questions 
about the conflict of interests in conducting functions by such members 
as well as about the independence of the entire State aid authority. No 
party should influence the appointment or dismissal of the members of 
these administrative bodies of controlling of State aid. Moreover, the 
analysis did show that other important dimensions related to the 
independence of the above-mentioned administrative authorities 
enforcing State aid rules in SEEs such as financial and human resources 
independence, were not fully guaranteed. The financial independence 
would minimize the influence of grantor or beneficiaries of State aid. On 
the other side, human resources should allow the abovementioned State 
Aid Commissions to gather process and distribute information which is 
needed for the authorization of State aid.  
The analysis of the annual reports on the progress towards accession in 
the European Union of the SEE countries shows that all SEEs have 
common problems in enforcing State aid rules. Most of the State aid 
schemes in SEEs are being implemented without being scrutinised 
before by the already established administrative capacities for State aid 
control. On the other hand, all the SEEs State aid monitoring 
mechanisms have approved all draft State aid schemes notified to them. 
More, the abovementioned Authorities have very rarely initiated ex-officio 
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investigations meaning that they have not challenged many major aid 
schemes. Importantly, State aid recovery decisions are almost missing.  
Recently many of the SEEs did change their laws on State Aid control. 
While providing further alignment with the EU State aid law, they also 
introduced new institutional designs for their State aid monitoring 
authorities. Presently, rules on State aid control in SEEs are implemented 
by: independent Commission/Agency for the Protection of Competition 
(Macedonia and Montenegro), by State Aid Commission accountable to 
the Parliament (Kosovo and Serbia) and lastly, by inter-governmental 
State Aid Commissions (Albania and Bosnia and Herzegovina). 
Renewing hopes for a better implementation of the State aid rules, the 
recent legal solutions protect the independence of the State aid 
authorities. 
However, implementation of the State aid law in Macedonia from the 
Commission for the Protection of Competition (CPC) since 2006 leaves 
more questions than answers with regard to the establishment of an 
effective State aid system in the SEE countries.  The 2010 Macedonian 
State aid law78 is largely compatible with the EU State aid acquis.79 
Further, bylaws have also been approved by the CPC during the years, 
                                                 
78 Law on State Aid Control adopted on 13.11.2010. Official Gazette of the Republic of 
North Macedonia No. 145/10. 
79 European Commission: North Macedonia Report, COM (2019) 260 final, SWD 218. 
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continuing the harmonisation with the acquis secondary legislation.80 
Additionally, the Macedonian Commission for the Protection of 
Competition is established by the legal provisions on competition as an 
independent authority having its own legal personality. Its president and 
four members of the CPC are appointed by the Parliament and the CPC 
is accountable to the Parliament. Although, analyzing EU Commission’s 
Progress Reports and the Annual Reports issued by the CPC, the 
problems in particular with regard to the implementation of State aid 
rules in Macedonia become evident. In particular, the number of the 
notifications with regard to the draft State aid schemes is low. The most 
recent EU Commission screening through its Progress Report of 2019 
observes that important State aid schemes are being implemented 
without being investigated by the CPC.81 Even before pursuant to the 
EU Commission, the ex-ante control performed by the CPC was partial 
due to the low number of the notifications.82 Additionally, many times 
draft State aid schemes are notified after they have started being 
implemented.83  
                                                 
80 The Macedonian Commission for Protection of Competition: Annual Report 2018 p. 
30, available at http://kzk.gov.mk/en/category/annual-reports/. Assessed November 
2019. 
81 European Commission: North Macedonia Report, COM (2019) 260 final, SWD 218.  
82 European Commission: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress 
Report, COM (2009) 533 final, SEC1335. 
83 European Commission: the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia Progress 
Report, COM (2007) 663 final, SEC1432. 
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 At the end of the EU accession negotiations, the SEEs should 
have established, inter alia, rules on State aid fully approximated with the 
EU acquis, as well as a credible State aid enforcement record. However, 
presently even the SEEs which have opened the EU accession 
negotiations have not yet started negotiations with regard to the 
competition chapter, which includes also State aid. In this phase of the 
enlargement, the approach of the European Commission vis a vis State 
aid monitoring process of the SEE countries is not accompanied by a 
strong pressure of compliance. Thus, the Albanian State Aid 
Commission enforcing State aid rules since 2006 has repeatedly been 
considered by the EU Commission not operationally independent, an 
express condition of the SAA with Albania. However, State aid rules in 
Albania continue to be implemented by the same State Aid Commission 
established since 2006. 
The former President of the EU Commission would clearly state back in 
2014 that there was not going to be any further enlargement until 2019. 
84 At present, taking into consideration the economic and political 
situation in the EU, accession of the new Member States does not seem 
likely in the near future. Increasing the length of the EU pre-accession 
phase for the SEE countries negatively affects the establishment of an 
effective State aid enforcement system in the EU candidate countries. 
The EU Eastern enlargement showed the Central and Eastern Europe 
                                                 
84 https://ec.europa.eu/commission/sites/beta-political/files/juncker-political-
guidelines-speech_en.pdf (last assessed November 2019) 
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Countries were willing to establish a successful State aid control system 
only, after EU accession became a realistic political option. 
Consequently, the incentive given to the Governments of the SEEs 
countries to restrain themselves from granting State aid might be a clear 
timeframe of the European Union membership. Until then, State aid 
rules in the SEE countries risk being enforced through isolated 
(independent) State Aid Monitoring Authorities, rarely notified about 
draft State aid schemes. 
 
